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This paper addresses the issues involved in taking a broader, quality of life-based 
approach rather than an income-based approach to assessing welfare. Using tools 
provided by the economics of happiness and relying on both large-scale surveys 
and field research in Latin America, the paper shows how a quality of life 
approach can help to evaluate the welfare effects of factors ranging from health, 
education, and unemployment status to institutional arrangements such as 
inequality and opportunity. Nonetheless, directly inferring policy implications 
from the results is problematic because of factors including norms and 
expectations based on differences in the way individuals answer questions to 
surveys and lack of clarity in the definition of happiness. The latter allows for 
research comparisons across individuals and cultures but presents challenges as a 




                                            
* This paper was undertaken in support of the Inter-American Development Bank’s 2008 Development in the 
Americas (DIA) report Beyond Facts: Understanding Quality of Life.   4
1. Introduction 
 
Economists have increasingly been questioning the extent to which traditional income and 
consumption-based measures of utility and welfare fully capture important elements of 
individual welfare. At the same time behavioral economists have been using experiments and 
other tools to explore how individuals depart from standard notions of rationality and welfare 
maximization. An outgrowth of these developments has been the new interest in happiness 
surveys as a tool for measuring welfare and well being. Happiness economics combines the 
techniques typically used by psychologists with the standard econometric tools more common to 
economists. The most important departure of happiness economics is that it relies on surveys in 
which individuals report their happiness levels as a measure of welfare rather than relying on the 
standard revealed preferences approach, which is based on measuring what people purchase or 
consume.  
Economists have traditionally shied away from survey data, which, like much other data, 
is rift with bias and measurement error problems. Yet increased usage of such data in recent 
years has resulted in improved econometric techniques for accounting for the errors. In addition, 
the results of large N studies demonstrate remarkable consistency in the determinants of well-
being or happiness across hundreds of thousands of individuals across countries and over time. 
There are, no doubt, cross-cultural differences in the definition of happiness, and it is key to the 
robustness of the studies that no attempt is made to define the term happiness in the surveys. 
Each respondent does so on his or her own.  
The lack of an externally imposed definition of happiness allows for the usage of the 
surveys as a research tool across diverse populations and cultures. Yet it presents challenges 
when applied to policy. The weight that is assigned to happiness as a policy objective will vary 
depending on how it is defined, and that in turn will vary across cultures and countries. 
Addressing those challenges will be critical to the successful application of happiness surveys to 
policy questions. This paper will discuss the specific problems associated with doing so.  These 
challenges notwithstanding, the approach has the potential to significantly enhance our 
understanding of human well being.  
Reflecting this interest in broader measures of welfare and their relevance to policy 
questions, the upcoming (November 2008) edition of the Inter-American Development Bank’s 
annual report will focus on quality of life in Latin America. As an input into that process, this   5
paper provides a summary what we know about the determinants of happiness in the region and, 
more generally, explores the extent to which happiness studies and surveys can help us better 
measure and understand quality of life. The paper summarizes the state of the art in the study of 
happiness in the region; assesses the future promises and pitfalls of happiness research as applied 
to relevant policy concerns; and explores the extent to which existing and/or readily accessible 
new research on happiness can illuminate the main components of quality of life that will be 
explored in the IDB report.  
 
2. The Economics of Happiness: A Novel Approach to Measuring Welfare
1 
 
While psychologists have long used surveys of reported well-being to study happiness, only 
recently have economists ventured into this arena. Early philosophers and economists, ranging 
from Aristotle to Bentham, Mill, and Smith, addressed the pursuit of happiness in their work. 
Yet, as economics grew more rigorous and quantitative, more parsimonious definitions of 
welfare took hold. Utility was taken to depend only on income as mediated by individual choices 
or preferences within a rational individual’s monetary budget constraint.  
Even within a more orthodox framework, focusing purely on income can miss key 
elements of welfare. People have different preferences for material and non-material goods, such 
as choosing a lower-paying but more personally rewarding job. Happiness economics relies on 
more expansive notions of utility and welfare, including interdependent utility functions, 
procedural utility, and the interaction between rational and non-rational influences in 
determining economic behavior. Richard Easterlin was the first modern economist to revisit the 
concept of happiness, beginning in the early 1970s, and more generalized interest took hold in 
the late 1990s.
2  
The economics of happiness does not purport to replace income-based measures of 
welfare but instead to complement them with broader measures of well-being. These measures 
are based on the results of large-scale surveys, across countries and over time, of hundreds of 
thousands of individuals who are asked to assess their own welfare. The surveys provide 
information about the importance of a range of factors which affect well-being, including not 
only income but also other factors such as health, marital and employment status, and civic trust.  
                                            
1 This section of the paper draws on Graham (2008).   
2 See, among others, Easterlin  (1974 and 2003), Blanchflower and Oswald (2004), Clark and Oswald (1994), Frey 
and Stutzer (2002a), Graham and Pettinato (2002), and Layard (2005).   6
This approach, which relies on expressed preferences rather than on revealed choices, is 
particularly well suited to answering questions in areas where a revealed preferences approach 
provides limited information. Indeed, it often uncovers discrepancies between expressed and 
revealed preferences. Revealed preferences cannot fully gauge the welfare effects of particular 
policies or institutional arrangements which individuals are powerless to change. Examples of 
these include the welfare effects of inequality, environmental degradation, and macroeconomic 
policies such as inflation and unemployment. Sen’s capabilities-based approach to poverty, for 
example, highlights the lack of capacity of the poor to make choices or to take certain actions. In 
many of his writings, Sen (1995) criticizes economists’ excessive focus on choice as a sole 
indicator of human behavior.
3 Another area where a choice approach is limited and happiness 
surveys can shed light is the welfare effects of addictive behaviors such as smoking and drug 
abuse, or of public health problems such as obesity, where differences in social norms and in 
future expectations and related variance in discount rates may be at play.
4  
Happiness surveys are based on questions in which the individual is asked “Generally 
speaking, how happy are you with your life?” or “How satisfied are you with your life?” with 
possible answers on a four-to-seven point scale. Psychologists have a preference for life 
satisfaction questions, yet answers to happiness and life satisfaction questions correlate quite 
closely. The correlation coefficient between the two—based on research on British data for 
1975–92, which includes both questions, and Latin American data for 2000–1, in which 
alternative phrasing was used in different years—ranges between 0.56 and 0.50.
5 
This approach presents several methodological challenges.
6 To minimize order bias, 
happiness questions must be placed at the beginning of surveys. As with all economic 
measurements, the answer of any specific individual may be biased by idiosyncratic, unobserved 
events. Bias in answers to happiness surveys can also result from unobserved personality traits 
and correlated measurement errors (which can be corrected via individual fixed effects if and 
when panel data are available). Other concerns about correlated unobserved variables are 
common to all economic disciplines.  
                                            
3 Sen (1995). 
4 For an application of this line of thinking to the obesity problem, see Felton and Graham (2005) and Graham and 
Ladkawalla (2006).  
5 Blanchflower and Oswald (2004); Graham and Pettinato (2002). 
6 For a fuller description of these challenges, see Bertrand and Mullanaithan (2001) and Frey and Stutzer (2002b).   7
Despite the potential pitfalls, cross-sections of large samples across countries and over 
time find remarkably consistent patterns in the determinants of happiness. Many errors are 
uncorrelated with the observed variables and do not systematically bias the results. 
Psychologists, meanwhile, find validation in the way that people answer these surveys based on 
physiological measures of happiness, such as activity in the brain’s frontal lobes and on the 
number of “genuine” (Duchenne) smiles.
7  
Micro-econometric happiness equations have the standard form: Wit = α + βxit + εit , 
where W is the reported well-being of individual i at time t, and X is a vector of known variables 
including socio-demographic and socioeconomic characteristics. Unobserved characteristics and 
measurement errors are captured in the error term. Because the answers to happiness surveys are 
ordinal rather than cardinal, they are best analyzed via ordered logit or probit equations. These 
regressions typically yield lower R-squares than economists are used to, reflecting the extent to 
which emotions and other components of true well-being are driving the results, as opposed to 
the variables that we are able to measure, such as income, education, and marital and 
employment status.  
The availability of panel data in some instances, as well as advances in econometric 
techniques, are increasingly allowing for sounder analysis.
8 The coefficients produced from 
ordered probit or logistic regressions are remarkably similar to those from OLS regressions 
based on the same equations. While it is impossible to measure the precise effects of independent 
variables on true well-being, happiness researchers have used the OLS coefficients as a basis for 
assigning relative weights to them. They can estimate how much income a typical individual in 
the United States or Britain would need to produce the same change in stated happiness that 




                                            
7 Diener and Seligman (2004). 
8 Van Praag and Ferrer-i-Carbonell (2004). 
9 Blanchflower and Oswald (2004).   8
3. The Easterlin Paradox 
 
In his original study, Easterlin revealed a paradox that sparked interest in the topic but is as yet 
unresolved. While most happiness studies find that within countries wealthier people are, on 
average, happier than poor ones, studies across countries and over time find very little, if any, 
relationship between increases in per capita income and average happiness levels. On average, 
wealthier countries (as a group) are happier than poor ones (as a group); happiness seems to rise 
with income up to a point, but not beyond it. Yet even among the less happy, poorer countries, 
there is not a clear relationship between average income and average happiness levels, 
suggesting that many other factors—including cultural traits—are at play (Figure 1).  
Within countries, income matters to happiness.
10 Deprivation and abject poverty in 
particular are very bad for happiness. Yet after basic needs are met, other factors in addition to 
income become increasingly important, such as rising aspirations, relative income differences, 
and the security of gains. Long before the economics of happiness was established, James 
Duesenberry (1949) noted the impact of changing aspirations on income satisfaction and its 
potential effects on consumption and savings rates. Any number of happiness studies have since 
confirmed the effects of rising aspirations and have also noted their potential role in driving 
excessive consumption and other perverse economic behaviors.
11 
Thus, a common interpretation of the Easterlin paradox is that humans are on a “hedonic 
treadmill”: aspirations increase along with income and, after basic needs are met, relative rather 
than absolute levels of income matter to well-being. Another interpretation of the paradox is 
psychologists’ “set point” theory of happiness, in which every individual is presumed to have a 
happiness level that he or she goes back to over time, even after major events such as winning 
the lottery or getting divorced.
12 The implication of this theory for policy is that nothing much 
can be done to increase happiness. 
Individuals are remarkably adaptable, no doubt, and in the end can get used to most 
things, and in particular to income gains. The behavioral economics literature, for example, 
shows that individuals value losses more than gains.
13 Easterlin argues that individuals adapt 
more in the pecuniary arena than in the non-pecuniary arena, while life-changing events such as 
                                            
10 Oswald (1997) and Diener et al. (2003), among others. 
11 See Frank (1999). 
12 Easterlin (2003). 
13 See Kahneman, Diener and Schwarz (1999), among others.   9
bereavement have lasting effects on happiness. Yet, because most policy is based on pecuniary 
measures of well-being, it overemphasizes the importance of income gains to well-being and 
underestimates that of other factors, such as health, family, and stable employment.  
There is no consensus about which interpretation is most accurate. Yet numerous studies 
demonstrating that happiness levels can change significantly in response to a variety of factors 
suggest that the research can yield insights into human well-being which provide important, if 
complementary, information for policymakers. More recent studies by psychologists, meanwhile, 
suggest that there are some events that individuals never adapt back from.
14 Even under the 
rubric of set point theory, meanwhile, accepting that levels eventually adapt upwards to a longer-
term equilibrium, mitigating or preventing the unhappiness and disruption that individuals 
experience for months, or even years, certainly seems a worthwhile objective for policy.  
 
4. Selected Applications of Happiness Economics 
 
Happiness research has been applied to a range of issues, all of which is could be relevant to 
quality of life in Latin America.  These include the relationship between income and happiness, 
inequality and poverty, the effects of macro-policies on individual welfare, and the effects of 
public policies aimed at controlling addictive substances.  
Some studies have attempted to separate the effects of income from those of other 
endogenous factors, such as satisfaction in the workplace. Studies of unexpected lottery gains 
find that these isolated gains have positive effects on happiness, although it is not clear that they 
are of a lasting nature.
15 A recent study based on the German socio-economic panel (GSEOP) 
finds that individuals adapt to income gains very quickly but, in contrast, status changes have 
more lasting effects on well-being.
16 Other studies have explored the reverse direction of 
causality, and find that people with higher happiness levels tend to perform better in the labor 
market and to earn more income in the future.
17 
A related question, and one which is still debated in economics, is how income inequality 
affects individual welfare. Interestingly, the results differ between developed and developing 
economies. Most studies of the United States and Europe find that inequality has modest or 
                                            
14 Diener, Lucas and Scollon (2006).  
15 Gardner and Oswald (2001). 
16 DiTella, Haisken-DeNew and MacCulloch (2004). 
17 Diener et al. (2003); Graham, Eggers and Sukhtankar (2004).   10
insignificant effects on happiness; these mixed results may reflect the fact that inequality can be 
a signal of future opportunity and mobility as much as it can be a sign of injustice.
18 In contrast, 
our own recent research on Latin America finds that inequality is negative for the well-being of 
the poor and positive for the rich. In a region where inequality is much higher and where public 
institutions and labor markets are notoriously inefficient, inequality signals persistent 
disadvantage or advantage rather than opportunity and mobility.
19 
Happiness surveys also facilitate the measurement of the effects of broader, non-income 
components of inequality such as race, gender, and status, all of which seem to be highly 
significant.
20 These results find support in work in the health arena, which finds that relative 
social standing has significant effects on health outcomes.
21 
Happiness research can deepen our understanding of poverty, which is, no doubt, a 
critical factor eroding quality of life in Latin America. The set point theory suggests that a 
destitute peasant can be very happy. While this contradicts a standard finding in the literature—
namely, that poor people are less happy than wealthier people within countries—it is suggestive 
of the role that low expectations play in explaining persistent poverty in some cases. Work on 
social mobility by Birdsall and Graham (1999), meanwhile, suggests that high and persistent 
levels of inequality—which they distinguish from the kind of inequality that rewards 
productivity and innovation—can exacerbate the low expectations/poverty trap.
22   
What is perceived to be poverty in one context may not be in another. People who are 
high up the income ladder can identify themselves as poor, while many of those who are below 
the objective poverty line do not, because of different expectations.
23 In addition, the well-being 
of those who have escaped poverty is often undermined by insecurity and the risk of falling back 
into poverty. Income data do not reveal this vulnerability, yet happiness data shows that it has 
strong negative effects on their welfare. Indeed, the reported well-being of the formerly poor is 
often lower than that of the poor themselves.
24  
Happiness surveys can be used to examine the effects of different macro-policy 
arrangements on well-being. Most studies find that inflation and unemployment have negative 
                                            
18 Alesina, Di Tella and MacCulloch (2004). 
19 Graham and Felton (2006).  
20 Graham and Felton (2006).  
21 Marmot (2004). 
22 Birdsall and Graham (1999). 
23 Rojas (2004). 
24 Graham and Pettinato (2002).   11
effects on happiness. The effects of unemployment are stronger than those of inflation and hold 
above and beyond those of forgone income,
25 such that the standard “misery index,” which 
assigns equal weight to inflation and unemployment, may be underestimating the effects of the 
latter on well-being.
26 Political arrangements also matter. Much of the literature finds that both 
trust and freedom have positive effects on happiness.
27 Research based on variance in voting 
rights across cantons in Switzerland finds that there are positive effects from participating in 
direct democracy,
28 and our research in Latin America finds a strong positive correlation between 
happiness and preference for democracy.
29  
Happiness surveys can also be utilized to gauge the welfare effects of various public 
policies. How does a tax on addictive substances such as tobacco and alcohol, for example, affect 
well-being? A recent study on cigarette taxes suggests that the negative financial effects may be 
outweighed by positive self-control effects.
30  
Given the wide range of potential applications for these surveys, they can and should 
provide important insights into quality of life in the region, as well as serve as a tool for 
measuring quality of life. At the same time, for a number of reasons, which are discussed below, 
caution is necessary when directly applying the research findings to policy. Prior to discussing 
happiness studies as an input to quality of life measures, however, it is necessary to see how the 
determinants of happiness in Latin America compare to other places where those determinants 
have been studied.  
 
5. The Determinants of Happiness: How Does Latin America Compare?  
 
Our 2002 study of happiness in Latin America was the first study of happiness in such a large 
sample of developing countries and certainly the first for the region. We have confirmed the 
general direction of those findings in a number of studies since then.
31 In the 2002 study, we 
compared the determinants of happiness in Latin America with those in the United States. For 
the United States, we used the pooled data for 1973-1998 from the General Social Survey (GSS). 
We also compared the determinants of happiness in Latin America with those in another large 
                                            
25 Di Tella, MacCulloch and Oswald (2001). 
26 Frey and Stutzer (2002b). 
27 Helliwell (2005); Layard (2005). 
28 Frey and Stutzer (2002b). 
29 Graham and Sukhtankar (2004). 
30 Gruber and Mullainathan (2002). 
31 Graham and Pettinato (2002); Graham and Sukhtankar (2004); Graham and Felton (2006).    12
sample of respondents in a very different context, Russia. For Russia we relied on the most 
recent available survey (2000) from the Russian Longitudinal Monitoring Survey (RLMS). For 
Latin America, we relied on the 2001 Latinobarómetro. We used data for 2001, as it is the one 
year for which we have variables for both self-reported health status and for being a member of a 
minority group, which makes it comparable to the U.S. and Russia surveys. (See Tables 1, 2, 3.) 
In our other studies, based on a pooled sample for several years of Latinobarómetro rather than 
on cross-sections for particular years, we obtain essentially the same results.   
We find a remarkable degree of similarity: there are similar age, income, education, 
marriage, employment, and health effects.
32 In all contexts, unemployed people are less happy 
than others. Self-employed people are happier in the United States and in Russia on average, 
while in Latin America they are less happy. While self-employment is a choice in the United 
States, in Latin America the self-employed are often in the informal sector by default.  Another 
difference is that women are happier than men in the United States, while in Russia men are 
happier than women (due to disparities in status?) and in Latin America there is no gender 
difference. Blacks are less happy than other races in the United States, and similarly, those that 
identify as minorities in Latin America are less happy. In contrast, minorities are happier than 
ethnic Russians.  
Even these subtle differences in the determinants of well-being suggest that the analysis 
of reported well-being highlights public policy challenges such as inadequate employment 
opportunities and unequal gender rights. While these issues often enter the public debate as a 
result of pressure from special interests such as unions or NGOs, it is novel to find strong 
backing for them in individual assessments of welfare.  
We also find that in both Latin America and Russia happier people are more likely to 
support market policies, to be satisfied with how democracy was working, and to prefer 
democracy to any other system of government. Happier people, on average, have higher 
prospects for their own and their children’s future mobility; are more likely to believe that the 
distribution of income in their country was fair; place themselves higher on a notional economic 
ladder; and have less fear of unemployment.
33  
                                            
32 The coefficient on marriage for Latin America is positive but short of significant for the 2001 sample. For other 
years for which we have data, the coefficient on marriage is positive and significant.  
33 The economic ladder question (ELQ) asked respondents to place themselves on a nine-step ladder representing 
their society, where the poor are on step 1 and the rich are on step 9. Support for market policies was measured by   13
The above studies are based on cross-sections from the Latinobarómetro. For one country 
in Latin America, Peru, we have data on both reported and objective well-being for the same 
respondents over a 10-year period. This allows us to get a picture of the over time effects of 
income on happiness, as well as to begin to separate out what is driven by contextual factors 
versus what is driven by individual specific personality traits. We also have similar data for 
Russia.  
In Peru, we re-interviewed a sub-sample (500) of respondents in a large, nationally 
representative panel for 1991-2000 and asked a number of questions about their perceptions of 
their past progress and for their future prospects. We repeated this perceptions survey three years 
in a row. The most significant and surprising finding was that almost half of the respondents with 
the most upward mobility reported that their economic situation was negative or very negative 
compared to 10 years prior. (See Figure 2.) We conducted a similar analysis based on 
comparable data for Russia, and found an even higher percentage of frustrated respondents—or  
“frustrated achievers” as we now call them (Figure 3).  
  These frustrated achievers (FAs) were at or about average income (and therefore not the 
poorest in the sample). They were slightly older on average than non-frustrated respondents with 
upward mobility, and there were no significant gender or education differences.
34 The FAs 
scored lower on a whole host of perceptions questions, such as their perceived prospects of 
upward mobility and their position on a notional economic ladder. They also had a higher fear of 
being unemployed in the future. In addition, the Russian FAs were more likely to want to restrict 
the incomes of the rich and were less satisfied with the market process and with democracy (we 
did not have the same questions in the original survey for Peru).
35 
In Peru the likelihood of having upward mobility and being frustrated (a frustrated 
achiever) is negatively related to initial income levels.
36 In other words, the frustrated achievers 
started from lower income levels, on average, even though they are not the very poorest in the 
                                                                                                                                             
an index based on several scaled questions about the private sector, foreign investment, free trade, and privatization. 
For detail, see Graham and Pettinato (2002).   
34 For a complete picture of the statistically significant differences between frustrated and non-frustrated upwardly 
mobile respondents, see Graham and Pettinato (2002), Chapter 4. 
35 In an initial and at this point cursory analysis of the 2003 Peru survey data, Graham and MacLeod (2003) find that 
the frustrated achievers are less likely to favor democracy, but there is no link with market policies. Yet the results 
are also not fully comparable, as a much lower number of respondents had upward mobility during this latter period 
and thus there was a far lower percentage of frustrated achievers.  
36 Finding is based on a logit regression on the probability of being a frustrated achiever. Results are reported in 
Graham (2005).     14
sample at the time that they answered our survey. This is not surprising, as thus even large 
percentage increases in their incomes will seem insufficient to reach the levels of wealthier 
groups. The FAs were also more likely to be urban, and therefore more informed about the 
lifestyles of others, including those of the very wealthy.  
Relative income differences could certainly be a plausible explanation for these 
frustrations, as both Peru and Russia have high degrees of inequality. The FAs were more likely 
to score lower on the notional economic ladder in both surveys, as well as to compare their 
situation negatively to others in their community and their country in Peru (this latter question 
was not in the Russia survey).  
A lack of adequate social insurance and insecurity could be another explanation. As noted 
above, the FAs had a higher fear of unemployment than non-frustrated achievers. Thus, even 
though the FAs are doing well by objective income measures, they perceive that there is no 
guarantee of stability or maintaining their earnings level. This is not surprising, given that both 
surveys were conducted in very volatile economic contexts, and the objective mobility data 
reveal a remarkable degree of vulnerability.
37  
Most of the FAs were at mean levels of education. In Latin America, with the opening of 
trade and capital markets in the 1990s, those with higher levels of education are gaining high 
marginal returns compared to the rest of society, while those with secondary education are seeing 
decreasing marginal returns compared to those with primary education.
38 Prior to this opening, 
people with secondary education were able to lead relatively stable, “middle class” lives. Yet by 
the end of the 1990s, the income gaps between the middle and the poor had narrowed, and the 
public sector jobs which many of this cohort held were far fewer and less desirable.
39 The 
unemployed, for example, are disproportionately represented among those with completed or 
almost completed secondary education.
40 
Lastly, it is quite plausible that some of the frustrations that we find are driven by 
individual character traits. There is probably some percent of every sample that will always be 
                                            
37 A higher percentage of respondents went from “rags to riches”—or from the bottom to the top quintile—in 10-
year period in Peru (5 percent) than in a similar period in the United States (1 percent), for example. Yet a surprising 
11 percent of respondents in the middle of the distribution (quintile 4 in Peru) fell back all the way to the bottom 
quintile during the same period, which is analogous to falling from the middle class into extreme poverty.   
38 See Behrman, Birdsall, and Székely (2000).  
39 We discuss this in detail, and introduce a measure of “middle income stress” (MIS) in Birdsall, Graham, and 
Pettinato (2001).   
40 Graham and Felton (2006).    15
negative or unhappy, regardless of objective conditions. Yet we do not have the over-time data 
that is necessary to test this proposition.  Some intersect of contextual variables and character 
traits is likely driving the frustrations of our achievers. 
 
5.1 Inequality and Opportunity 
 
Clearly the frustrated achievers findings are highlighting the role of insecurity and inequality in 
undermining well-being in the region. The effect of inequality on individual welfare remains a 
debated question in economics.  In a separate study, Andrew Felton and I looked at the effects of 
inequality on happiness in Latin America and found that this is one important area where the 
region looks very different from the OECD countries.
41  In Europe and the United States   
inequality does not seem to have significant effects on happiness one way or the other. In those 
contexts, and particularly the United States, inequality seems to signal mobility and opportunity 
as much as it suggests injustice. In stark contrast, we find that inequality has significant effects 
on well-being in Latin America, making those in the highest quintile five percent happier than 
the average and those in the poorest quintile five percent less happy.  Indeed, the effects of 
relative income differences in the region—measured as each respondent’s distance from the 
mean wealth level for his or her country—held regardless of average country level incomes, 
which had no effect. (See Table 4.)  
In a simple illustration we show how a respondent in the poorest quintile in Honduras, 
whose distance from the country mean is half that of a respondent in the poorest quintile in 
Chile, is happier than the respondent in Chile because of smaller relative differences. Yet the 
poor Honduran is twice as poor in objective terms. (See Figure 4.)  
We conducted the same analysis using different reference norms, and compared 
respondents in large, medium, and small-sized cities. Our results were similar, except that in the 
small cities average income levels still had a significant positive effect, in addition to relative 
income levels, suggesting that at lower levels of income, concerns for relative income are still 
mediated by absolute levels, a finding which is consistent with the broader literature (and the 
Easterlin paradox).  
We also looked at the effects of perceptions of inequality, as measured by respondents’ 
response on the economic ladder question and perceived prospects of upward mobility.  Two 
                                            
41 Graham and Felton (2006).    16
questions in particular allow us to separate feelings of status from other economic concerns or 
utility of wealth.  One of these is a catch-all question asking “In general, how would you 
describe your present economic situation and that of your family?”  This variable is consistently 
one of the most significant to well-being, usually more so than any other except health.  The 
other is the economic ladder question (ELQ), included in many other well-being surveys besides 
the Latinobarómetro, which asks respondents to place themselves on a 10-step ladder where the 
poorest are on step one and the richest on step ten.  This question is also an important predictor 
of happiness, even when other questions about wealth are included.  It is purely a relative 
ranking of wealth.  When combined with the personal economy question, it allows us to 
decompose the utility of wealth into status and other effects. (See Table 5.)  
We looked at how these scores varied according to where people live (city sizes).  Wealth 
levels are, on average, higher in large cities than in small ones. In contrast, we found that 
respondents’ subjective personal economic rankings were lower in big cities and higher in small 
towns, as shown in Table 5.  In our view, this perceptions gap is in keeping with other findings in 
the happiness literature. It is suggestive of Luttmer’s recent (2005) work on U.S. earnings areas 
and our own findings on average country level wealth. In both cases, respondents of similar 
income or wealth levels are less happy when their peers or compatriots have higher levels of 
wealth. James Duesenberry’s classic work on savings also resonates. He finds that, holding 
income levels constant, respondents who live in neighborhoods with higher average levels of 
wealth are less satisfied with their incomes than those who live in less wealthy neighborhoods. 
ELQ, on the other hand, rises with city size (as does wealth), and even after controlling 
for socio-demographic data, ELQ rankings tend to be higher in big cities.  Once again, this 
appears to be a reference-group effect: people in small cities are more likely to know how others 
around them live than are those in medium or large ones, and for the most part they are fairly on 
par with their neighbors, as there is less variance in wealth levels in smaller cities. People in big 
cities, meanwhile, are probably aware that objective economic conditions in the countryside and 
smaller towns are worse than they are in the major cities. 
A related inequality perceptions variable was the time respondents thought it would take 
to reach their desired standard of living. The question was phrased as: “how long do you think it 
will take you to reach your desired standard of living?” with possible answers ranging from “I 
already have it” to several different year categories (1 to 2 years; 5 to 10 years, and so on) to   17
“never.”  Respondents who live in small towns are more likely to report “never,” while there was 
no significant difference in the responses of those that live in big cities from those in medium 
ones. It is likely that those in small towns, particularly rural ones, are well aware that the greatest 
opportunities for both education and employment are in larger urban areas rather than in their 
small towns. Meanwhile, those respondents with completed secondary school were the most 
likely to answer “never” or the next lowest score. Again, trends in returns to education are likely 
playing a role. 
To help explain our findings, we examined a variable that asked respondents to choose 
what affected them most among the many reasons for which there was unequal treatment of 
people in their countries. Possible answers ranged from skin color to poverty to age. Respondents 
in small towns were more likely to say that poverty and lack of education were the primary 
reasons, while those in big cities were more likely to report corruption or the need to pay bribes.  
These findings suggest that both sets of respondents perceive that there is inequality and 
injustice. Yet the responses suggest that those in small towns feel that they do not have access to 
opportunity due to their own poverty and education (explaining a higher tendency to the “never” 
responses on the above question), while those in big cities are more likely to believe that 
opportunities and access are monopolized by those with greater means or connections.  
Those in small towns seem more concerned about their own poverty compared to the rest 
of society, while those in large cities are more concerned with their access to opportunities 
compared with more “connected” individuals. In both instances, the concerns cited run in the 
opposite direction of an interpretation in which inequality signals opportunity and mobility, 




One of the most important variables affecting well-being or happiness is employment status. An 
obvious question is how the region compares. Previous happiness research has found that 
unemployment is one of the most traumatic events that can happen to people.  One of the reasons 
for this is, of course, the loss of income; however, there is also a cultural stigma to 
unemployment that impacts happiness.  The typical unemployed person in our study is a male 
who has attended some high school (on average 10 years of education).  The unemployed 
percentage of the population increases with city size; this may be an artifact of the data, however,   18
because people in rural areas are more likely to be outside the formal labor force altogether and 
unemployment is a less relevant concept for them.  
The strength of these effects—i.e., the “costs” of unemployment—tends to vary across 
countries and regions. We build from the work of others. Di Tella, MacCulloch, and Oswald 
(2001) find that respondents in the United States and Europe are made unhappier by higher 
unemployment rates than they are by inflation.
42 In other words, the typical respondent—
including employed respondents—would accept higher levels of inflation if it would eliminate 
the insecurity associated with higher unemployment rates.  
Several studies have shown that increased unemployment in general lessens the impact 
on unemployed individuals.  Clark and Oswald (1994) find that the unemployed in Britain are 
less unhappy in districts where the unemployment rate is higher.
43 The costs to happiness that 
comes from the decreased probability of finding a job seems to be lower than the gains to 
happiness that come from being less stigmatized and accompanied by more unemployed counter-
parts. Similarly, Stutzer and Lalive (2004) find that unemployed respondents are less happy in 
cantons that have voted to reduce unemployment benefits in Switzerland (controlling for benefit 
levels), as the stigma from unemployment is higher. Eggers, Gaddy, and Graham (2006) find that 
both employed and unemployed respondents are happier in regions with higher unemployment 
rates in Russia.
44  
We, too, find positive effects of general unemployment on happiness in Latin America, 
both using an unemployment rate calculated from our own data and the latest statistics available 
from the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC).  
These are country-wide unemployment rates and have statistically significant positive effects on 
happiness.  As in the above studies, higher overall unemployment may reduce the stigma effect 
on individuals. The results must be tempered, though, by the limited information that open 
unemployment rates can provide in a region with high levels of informal employment (exceeding 
50 percent in a few countries). 
Inequality in countries also has an effect on happiness among the unemployed.  Using our 
pooled data set from 1997-2004, we ran a standard happiness regression, including a control 
variable for being unemployed, and then adding interaction terms for being unemployed in a 
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high or low Gini country. We find, as shown in Table 6a, that the costs to happiness of being 
unemployed are lower in higher Gini countries.  In other words, unemployed respondents in 
countries with higher inequality are actually happier than those in countries with low inequality.  
Countries with high inequality are also, on balance, poorer than other countries, so the 
unemployed may have less far to fall.   
Another reason may be the higher levels of informal employment in the poorer and more 
unequal countries in the region, thereby resulting in less stigma for the unemployed. Or it may be 
due to some other country-level unobservable that we are not accounting for. And while the costs 
of being unemployed are lower in higher Gini countries, fear of unemployment (among the 
employed) is higher, in keeping with our intuition about greater levels of informality and 
associated insecurity. Thus in higher inequality countries, the lower stigma for the unemployed is 
accompanied by greater insecurity for the employed.  
Job instability has particularly affected those with a high-school level of education, and if 
we look at the happiness impact of unemployment among different educational groups, it turns 
out that, in addition to having the highest rate of unemployment, those with a high school 
education are also made most unhappy by unemployment.  In fact, as shown in Table 6b, 
unemployment has a statistically insignificant effect on happiness at the ends of the education 
spectrum.  College-educated people are also less likely to fear unemployment than those with 
less education, and unemployment is a less relevant concept for the illiterate, who are most likely 
to be outside the formal labor market to begin with. Moreover, those with higher education are 
more likely to be able to find another job than those with secondary school education. 
We also looked at the costs to unemployment by city size. As in the case of our Gini 
coefficients, we find that the costs of unemployment are lower in big cities than they are in small 
towns, suggesting that there is a lower stigma effect in big cities. Yet again, as in the case of 
inequality (as measured by the Gini), fear of unemployment is higher in the big cities, 
presumably because labor markets are more integrated into the international economy and 
volatility is more of a factor, while relying on farming as a safety net is not an option the way it 
is in smaller towns.  (See Table 6b.) 
Our findings are suggestive of how the costs of being unemployed can vary across 
countries and according to different measures of inequality. Inequality seems to be correlated   20
with a lower “stigma” for the unemployed, but with a higher fear of unemployment for the 
employed.  
 
6. Policy Implications 
 
Richard Layard makes a bold statement about the potential of happiness research to improve 
people’s lives directly via changes in public policy.
45  He highlights the extent to which people’s 
happiness is affected by status—resulting in a “rat race” approach to work and to income gains, 
which in the end reduces well-being. He also notes the strong positive role of security in the 
workplace and in the home, and of the quality of social relationships and trust. He identifies 
direct implications for fiscal and labor market policy in the form of taxation on excessive income 
gains and via re-evaluating the merits of performance-based pay.   
While many economists would not agree with Layard’s specific recommendations, there 
is nascent consensus that happiness surveys can serve as an important complementary tool for 
public policy. Scholars such as Diener and Seligman and Kahneman et al. advocate the creation 
of national well-being accounts to complement national income accounts.
46  
Despite the potential contributions that happiness research can make to policy, a sound 
note of caution is necessary in directly applying the findings, both because of the potential biases 
in survey data and because of the difficulties associated with analyzing this kind of data in the 
absence of controls for unobservable personality traits. In addition, happiness surveys at times 
yield anomalous results which provide novel insights into human psychology—such as   
adaptation and coping during economic crises—but do not translate into viable policy 
recommendations.  
One example is the finding (discussed above) that unemployed respondents are happier 
(or less unhappy) in contexts with higher unemployment rates. The positive effect that reduced 
stigma has on the well-being of the unemployed seems to outweigh the negative effects of a 
lower probability of future employment.
47 One interpretation of these results for policy—raising  
unemployment rates – would obviously be a mistake. At the same time, the research suggests a 
new focus on the effects of stigma on the welfare of the unemployed.  
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Both the promises and pitfalls of applying happiness research to policy apply to Latin 
America.  Certainly, there is great promise in understanding a variety of phenomena, many of 
them poverty related, that revealed preferences cannot tell us much about. As noted above, two 
sets of questions along these lines come to the fore. The first of these is the welfare effects of 
macro and institutional arrangements that individuals are powerless to change, such as 
macroeconomic volatility, inequality, or weak governance structures. In a region where access to 
political as well as economic opportunities are unequally shared, the poor are obviously least 
able to express their preferences (as they are the least able to either circumvent the system or 
vote with their feet and emigrate or put their assets abroad). Yet they may likely suffer the 
negative welfare effects from inequality, as the above findings suggest.   
The other set of questions are those in which behaviors are not the result of preferences, 
but of norms, addiction, or self-control problems. Any number of public health-related questions, 
such as obesity, cigarette smoking, and other phenomena, can and have been addressed by 
happiness surveys and could be usefully analyzed in the region, as it suffers from many of these 
public health problems. Equally important, though, are those behaviors that are driven by low 
expectations. If the poor have low expectations for their own and their children’s future—and  if 
that is exacerbated by high and persistent levels of inequality as in Latin America—their   
behavior on any number of fronts, ranging from investing in their children’s education to saving 
to public health attitudes, could be compromised. If those behaviors are merely analyzed as a 
result of revealed preferences, then the policy implications will be very different than if they are 
analyzed in the context of the well-being costs associated with those behaviors.
48  
A second area of much promise for applying well-being surveys to policy is in the 
exploration and understanding of the importance of non-income variables, such as health, 
education, employment status, gender rights, environment, and any number of other variables to 
well-being and quality of life. Standard approaches, which rely on income-based measures of 
well-being, tend to underweight the importance of these variables. Happiness surveys not only 
highlight their importance but also allow us to attach relative weights to them. 
Along those lines, the recent move to develop national well-being indicators in both the 
United States and the United Kingdom is based on the assumption that happiness surveys can 
help us better gauge the relative weights of these variables, as well as track how those relative 
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weights change over time across large N samples.  The idea behind National Well-Being 
Indicators is that, in the same way and as a complement to the way GNP tracks income trends 
over time, well-being in these areas could be tracked and assessed. It is an approach that holds 
much promise for helping to measure quality of life in Latin America. 
While there are certainly many promises for applying the results of happiness surveys to 
policy, there are also many caveats. Three in particular stand out in the context of Latin America. 
The first is the extent to which individuals adapt to many situations, both upward and 
downwards.
49 This has clear implications for a region with very volatile growth. A number of 
studies suggest that people’s expectations rise with rapid income growth and/or income gains 
and then drop with recessions and/or income losses. This will obviously affect trends in well- 
being indicators as economies change throughout the region.  
A related issue, alluded to above, is the so-called happy peasant problem. In this instance, 
there are many cases where very poor and uninformed respondents, who happen to have a high 
set point (cheerful nature), report they are very happy, even though they live in destitute poverty. 
The implications of this information for policy are very unclear. Should policy raise the 
peasant’s awareness of how bad his or her situation is in order to raise expectations, although 
risking making them miserable? Should policy leave the peasant ignorant? How policy factors in 
set point/character differences is another difficult normative question. Should policy listen to the 
naturally unhappy respondents who have a tendency to complain more than to others? How 
much is expectations and how much is character, for example?  
Another issue is cardinal versus ordinal measures. Happiness surveys are ordinal in 
nature and do not attach cardinal weights to the answers. Thus no distinction is made between 
the answers very happy and happy or happy and unhappy. Yet if these measures are really used 
to guide policy, does it become necessary to attach such weights? Does unhappiness matter more 
than happiness, for example? How does one choose between a policy that raises a happy person 
to very happy versus one that raises an unhappy person to just happy status? Many of these 
choices require normative judgments.  
                                            
49 Herrera, Razafindrakoto and Roubaud (2006), for example, using panel data for Peru and Madagascar, find that 
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Perhaps a more fundamental question is whether happiness should be a policy objective.  
Are happy people successful, for example, or simply complacent? There is some evidence that 
happier people, on average, perform better in the labor market and are healthier.
50 In other words, 
being happy seems to have positive causal effects on behavior. And certainly very unhappy or 
depressed people have all sorts of related negative externalities. But the evidence also suggests 
that there is a top limit to this. Psychologists find that those that answer happiness questions near 
the top end of a 10-point scale are indeed more successful, but the effects are stronger around the 
7-9 range rather than at the very top of the scale.
51 And there are certainly examples of very 
successful and creative people who are miserable for most of their lives. On average, though, it 
seems that happiness is correlated with better outcomes than is unhappiness or misery, and that 
eliminating the latter seems a worthwhile objective for policy.  
The definition of happiness is fundamental to resolving these questions. Attempting such 
a definition is clearly beyond the scope of such a paper—and of the author’s expertise. 
Philosophers have provided a range of definitions over centuries, and a more recent attempt to 
define happiness by Kenny and Kenny (2006), seems particularly well-suited to policy.
52 Kenny 
and Kenny define happiness as having three separate components: contentment, welfare, and 
dignity. Happiness defined simply as contentment seems an inappropriate objective for public 
policy. Yet when it is defined as a combination of these three factors, it seems more relevant, 
particularly for a region where the major policy challenge is not extreme poverty but relative 
poverty, vulnerability, and inequality of income and opportunity.  
Imposing a definition of happiness does not answer the question of how much weight 
policymakers should put on happiness as an objective versus others such as growth, policy 
reforms, and fiscal stability. There are inter-temporal considerations as well. Reforms can and do 
make people unhappy in the short term, but in the long run are likely to guarantee them more 
prosperity and possibly greater happiness. There is a significant body of evidence, from both the 
behavioral economics and the happiness literatures, that individuals are loss averse and value 
losses disproportionately to gains. The happiness literature additionally shows that individuals 
adapt very quickly to income gains but much less quickly to losses, and more quickly to changes 
in income than to changes in status. 
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There is also significant evidence of hyperbolic discounting: individuals will trade off 
much larger future benefits for much shorter short-term ones; it is not a coincidence that most 
developed economies have forced savings schemes. Our own work, meanwhile, which is in the 
initial stages, suggests that high levels of inequality or low levels of social mobility, and related 
low expectations, can result in higher discount rates (and therefore more hyperbolic discounting) 
for those in the lower income ranks. This discounting can apply to areas such as public health as 
well as in the income realms, and may help explain why phenomena such as obesity are 
concentrated among lower-income cohorts, at least in the developed economies.
53 
Certainly, understanding these behaviors is important information for policymakers. But 
can we use short-term happiness questions and measures as a gauge for policy? The information 
may be more useful for explaining lack of public support for optimal policies than it is as a guide 
to policy choice.  Structural policy reforms, for example, can result in major changes in income 
and status and related unhappiness for particular cohorts, at least in the short term, while 
producing gains in the aggregate in the long term.  
Latin America is a region that has for years suffered from the threat and the reality of 
populist politics and policies, which have primarily manifested themselves in fiscal profligacy 
for short-term political gain at the expense of longer-term investments in the structural changes 
in the macroeconomic and social policy realms that could generate sustainable growth and 
poverty reduction.
54 With the widespread turn to the market and acceptance of democratic 
institutions throughout most of the region in the 1990s, voting behavior seems to have matured 
and in some countries has begun to resemble patterns in developed countries. There have been 
several rounds of leadership change in countries ranging from Chile and Brazil to Peru and El 
Salvador, though without fundamental changes in economic policy. There have also been cases 
of countries undergoing significant economic crisis and still retaining democratic institutions and 
some continuity in economic management, as in Argentina. In the majority of countries, patterns 
are increasingly resembling retrospective voting, where voters judge past governments by their 
economic performance, and/or the patters are influenced by some degree of party or ideological 
loyalty. Voters are, for the most part, also making the important distinction that characterizes 
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mature democracy: that between support for systems of government and economic arrangements 
as opposed to specific governments in power.
55   
At the same time, there are also significant pockets of political instability and increasing 
support for populist politicians and policies, such as Venezuela, Ecuador, and Bolivia, where 
popular backlash against market reforms has also resulted in an erosion of democratic 
institutions. In these countries, the future of constitutional democracy as well as of pro-market 
policies is at risk. Meanwhile, support for many reforms, such as privatization, is remarkably 
shallow in the rest of the region, and governments face significant challenges in mustering the 
political support that is necessary to deepen reforms and make the structural and institutional 
changes that are necessary to establish the sustained and higher levels of growth that are 
necessary for poverty reduction. At the same time, inequality remains a challenge that defies 
established policy prescriptions and likely undermines support for reform. How can surveys of 
happiness be relevant in such a context?  
Indeed, taken at face value, happiness surveys could, at least in theory, lend support to 
populist politicians. If the results of a national happiness survey show that the majority of 
citizens prefer inflation to unemployment (as happiness surveys in most contexts, including Latin 
America, suggest), those results could fuel irresponsible fiscal policies in countries that are very 
vulnerable to hyper-inflation (which indeed makes people very unhappy). The kinds of structural 
reforms that are necessary for long-term growth, meanwhile, are unlikely to be supported by a 
population that has a high tendency for hyperbolic discounting. For example, how many voters 
will report that they are happier than before in the throes of a controversial privatization or tax 
reform, the benefits of which are not immediately clear? How can happiness surveys be useful in 
such a context?  
Surely there are risks. Yet our previous work also shows that economic crisis makes 
people very unhappy, and that happier people are more supportive of democracy and market 
reforms.
56  While the direction of causality is not clear (happier people may be more supportive 
of whatever policy context they live in), it does suggest that happiness is not inherently linked to 
support for irresponsible or anti-reform politics. And the same literature that finds that crisis 
reduces happiness in Latin America also finds that crisis is linked to decreased support for how 
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markets and democracy are working but increased  support for markets and democracies as 
systems.   
Perhaps the most useful role for happiness surveys in the context of Latin American 
economic policy, where there is reform fatigue, risk and loss aversion due to past experience 
with macroeconomic volatility and other crises, and a large proportion of the population that is, 
at least in theory, vulnerable to hyperbolic discounting, is in helping us understand and better 
navigate the political outcomes that can result. Is it really irrational if one is poor and 
unemployed in Ecuador, for example, to support an anti-system politician in the hope of change 
and a possible short-term improvement? And understanding what makes people most unhappy 
with the policy context, via well-being surveys, might also help reformists avert the kind of 
policy mistakes that lead to populist or “hyperbolic” politics.  
 
7. What Happiness Surveys Can Contribute to Quality of Life Measures 
 
The Inter-American Development Bank’s attempt to develop better quality of life measures for 
the region focuses on income and non-income measures. Happiness surveys from the region tell 
us about many of these measures – and how they compare to each other in relative terms in 
determining well being. While it is not accepted practice to compare coefficients on equations 
based on categorical variables, as is the case with the ordered logits that are typically used for 
happiness studies, the results of OLS regressions on the same data and with the same 
specifications typically yield very similar results. The latter can be used as a basis for attaching 
relative weights to the coefficients on independent variables, such as income and health. They 
can also highlight areas where we need to know more to better understand quality of life in the 
region.   
 
7.1  Happiness and Income 
 
Perhaps the most studied and least well understood relationship is that between happiness and 
income. Virtually all studies find that there is some relationship, but it varies across contexts and 
is mediated by a range of variables. Our study of happiness in Latin America shows that there is, 
as in the OECD countries, a strong and consistent relationship between income and happiness   27
within countries, but it is non-linear. Nor is it the most important determinant of happiness, with 
other variables such as health and unemployment having stronger effects.
57 (See Table 1.) 
Moreover, again as in the case of the OECD countries, there is no cross-country 
relationship between income and happiness. (See Figure 1.) What is most surprising about the 
Latin America findings, meanwhile, is that the non-linear relationship between income and 
happiness holds for countries that are at very low levels of GDP per capita, like Honduras and 
Guatemala. Earlier literature on the developed economies posited that non-linearities set in well 
after basic needs were met, at roughly $10,000 per capita. The Latin America results suggest that 
the level is much lower.  
  Similarly, the strong results that we obtain on the effects of relative income differences 
on happiness support this proposition. Average country income levels had no significant effects 
on happiness in any of the countries that we studied, even the very poor ones, while relative 
income differences dominated. Average income levels only mattered in a positive way for small, 
poor towns. At other levels of aggregation, such as medium and large cities, average income 
levels actually had a negative effect on happiness, as in the case of Luttmar’s work on Public Use 
Microdata Areas (PUMAs) in the United States.   
  In addition to inequality, our work also highlights an important role for volatility in 
undermining whatever positive effects income gains may have for happiness. Income gains, even 
relatively large ones, in the context of high levels of volatility, do not have the expected positive 
effects on happiness, at least not over time, as suggested by the results from our Peruvian 
frustrated achievers. 
  
7.2 Happiness and Education 
 
Education has a remarkably small effect on happiness among Latin American respondents. When 
income is included in the equation, education is typically insignificant, in contrast to OECD 
countries, where for the most part it has a modestly significant and positive effect in addition to 
income. (See Tables 1 and 3.) In all of these contexts, income and education are highly 
correlated. As our findings on unemployment above suggest, there are certain non-linearities in 
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the Latin American context, which those respondents who have either completed or near 
completed secondary school most vulnerable to unemployment, while those with completed 
higher and technical education earn the highest rewards in both relative and absolute terms. 
Those non-linearities, no doubt, mediate the education and happiness relationship.  
This is one instance where happiness surveys can highlight discrepancies between the 
predicted effects of variables which are typically associated with higher levels of quality of life, 
such as more years of education, and actual outcomes. While the surveys do not provide a clear 
policy solution, they provide an important first step towards understanding the problem. 
 
7.3 Happiness and Health 
Health is one of the most important determinants of well being nd, as some studies show, higher 
levels of well-being are also often associated with better health outcomes. Latin America is no 
exception. Of all of the variables in our happiness equations, health status, as gauged by an index 
of a number of pointed questions on self-reported health, has the strongest coefficient. (See Table 
1.)  This is consistent with studies in other contexts in both developed and developing countries.  
An area where we know much less is how the health-happiness relationship works among 
the poor. The poor are notorious for under-reporting health problems, not least because they 
rarely stay home from work when they are ill. Targeted happiness and health studies among 
lower income cohorts might help understand the variables mediating the relationship at lower 
levels of income, as well as factors which could encourage the poor (and their governments) to 
make better investments in their health. 
 
7.4 Happiness and Employment Status 
 
Another key determinant of happiness, everywhere that it has been studied, is employment 
status.  The experience of unemployment is one of the most deleterious events as far as 
happiness is concerned, and is one experience that most individuals do not adapt back from, as 
discussed above. Latin America is no exception. As shown in Table 1, the (negative) coefficient 
on unemployment is actually higher than that of either health or wealth, although the t-statistic 
on the other two variables is actually higher (most likely because of the smaller numbers of 
unemployed respondents as opposed to those that report their wealth or income).  
This result is hardly surprising in a region where there is, for the most part, no 
unemployment insurance or other safety net for the unemployed. In other contexts, while the   29
unemployed are still unhappier than others, they are less unhappy where there are more 
unemployed around them and/or where there is more support for unemployment benefits, as 
there is less stigma and less insecurity surrounding unemployment. Our findings on less negative 
effects of unemployment in higher inequality countries, where unemployment or at least 
informal employment levels are typically higher, supports the less stigma channel. Yet our 
higher levels of fear of unemployment (which has very negative effects on happiness) among 
employed respondents in the same countries supports the higher insecurity channel. A third area 
where employment status findings are different in Latin America is in the case of self-
employment. While the self-employed in the U.S. and Europe, for example, are on average 
happier than others, in Latin America they are less happy than the average. Here again is an 
instance where happiness surveys can yield insights into quality of life. In the former context the 
self-employed are usually self-employed by choice. In Latin America, in contrast, the majority of 
self-employed are working in the informal sector due to lack of available jobs in the formal 
sector and consequently have a lower quality of life.  
 
7.5 Other Key Variables and Happiness  
 
There are a number of areas where happiness surveys could yield valuable insights into quality 
of life in the region, but where more work remains to be done. One is in the area of social safety 
nets and other forms of social insurance. Our work on frustrated achievers and fear of 
unemployment suggests that insecurity and volatility are major causes of unhappiness in the 
region. But are respondents with access to better social welfare systems and other safety nets 
happier? This is an open question for research and could help provide insights into the kinds of 
social arrangements that best mediate this insecurity. 
Another area is inequality. We have some sense that inequality and perceived differences 
in rank, status, and access to opportunities have negative effects on happiness (at least for the 
poor) in the region. Do other kinds of inequality, such as racial and gender inequality, have 
similar effects? Which kinds of inequality are most important? Again, happiness surveys could 
help us better understand the role of these variables and their relative roles in determining quality 
of life in the region. A third area is job quality. Our self-employment results are certainly 
suggestive, but again this is an area where modest research efforts, building from existing 
findings, could yield very useful insights.    30
Finally, happiness surveys could help us track the effects of different policy 
arrangements, such as inflation versus unemployment and local versus centralized 
governments/democracy  on quality of life. Frey and Stutzer, cited above, show that participating 
in direct democracy has positive effects on happiness above and beyond the benefits of living in 
a direct democracy, and Helliwell and Putnam (2005) find that citizens living in contexts of 
greater social capital are also happier.
58 Better understanding these factors in Latin America 
could contribute to better measurement of quality of life more generally. Public health 
arrangements—such as access to health insurance, particularly in a context where many people 
lack coverage—may also matter to happiness. Analysis of such variables via happiness surveys 




Happiness studies can provide critical insights into quality of life in Latin America, in areas 
ranging from income, poverty and inequality to public health and political arrangements. Those  
studies can provide a method for gaining insights into many other questions, such as the effects 
of the environment or commuting time or modality on quality of life in the region.  Likewise, 
cautiously used national well-being indicators, used cautiously, meanwhile, can be a good tool 
for tracking welfare, quality of life, and other well being measures across countries and over 
time, and attaching relative weights to different variables. In the same way that GNP allows us to 
track economic growth within and across countries, national well-being measures provide a 
complementary tool for assessing welfare trends. Yet for all of the reasons cited above, including 
the happy peasant problem, adaptations and set points, hyperbolic discounting, and the absence 
of clarity on a definition of happiness, among others, caution is necessary before directly 
applying the results of happiness surveys to policy.  
Happiness economics opens a field of research questions which still need to be addressed, 
both more generally and as applied to quality of life in Latin America. These include the 
implications of well-being findings for national indicators and economic growth patterns; the 
effects of happiness on behavior such as work effort, consumption, and investment; and the 
effects on political behavior. In the case of the latter, surveys of unhappiness or frustration may 
be useful for gauging the potential for social unrest in various contexts. The Inter-American 
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Development Bank’s new focus on quality of life indicators will, hopefully, provide some 
impetus to this novel body of research. 
In order to answer many of these questions, researchers need more and better quality 
well-being data, particularly panel data, which allow for the correction of unobserved personality 
traits and correlated measurement errors, as well as for better determining the direction of 
causality (for example, from contextual variables such as income or health to happiness versus 
the other way around). These are major challenges in most happiness studies. Hopefully, the 
combination of better data and increased sophistication in econometric techniques will allow 
economists to better address these questions in the future and increase the potential of such 
surveys to become a critical component of defining and measuring quality of life in Latin 
America.  
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Table 1. Happiness in Latin America, 2001 
 
Dependent Variable: Happiness
Independent variables Coef. z 
Age -0.025 -4.21
Age squared 0.000 4.72
Male -0.002 -0.07
Married 0.056 1.63
Log wealth index 0.395 10.56






Self employed -0.098 -2.33






                                      Source: Author’s calculations based on Latinobarómetro, 2001. 
 
 
Table 2. Happiness in Russia, 2000 
 
Dependent Variable: Happiness
Independent variables Coef. z 
Age -0.067 -7.42
Age squared 0.001 7.15
Male 0.152 2.80
Married 0.088 1.40
Log equivalent income 0.389 11.48






Self employed 0.537 2.23













Table 3. Happiness in the United States, 1972-1998 
 
Dependent Variable:  Happiness 
Independent variables Coef. z 
Age -0.025 -5.20
Age squared 0.038 7.53
Male -0.199 -6.80
Married 0.775 25.32
Log income 0.163 9.48
Education 0.007 1.49
Black -0.400 -10.02













* Ordered logit estimation; year dummies included but not shown. 
Source: Author’s calculations based on General Social Survey (GSS) data. 
 
 




























Figure 2. Long-Term Perceived Mobility vs. 1991-2000 Income Mobility, Peru 2000
 
                                  Source: Graham and Pettinato (2002). 
 
 




































Table 4.  Average vs. Relative Wealth 
 
Ordered logit estimation of a 1-4 scale of happiness
country country country country
city size city size city size city size
0.111758 0.112175 0.096802
5.44** -6.9** 7.96**
-0.052326 0.059433 0.0543354 0.057839 -0.080508 0.016294









country country country country
citysml citysml citysml citysml
* t-statistics underneath coefficients
country country







* When calculating average wealth at the country level, country dummies cannot be included in the 
regression due to multicollinearity. When we run split sample regressions, by city size, average 
wealth is positive and significant for small cities. 
Demographic variables in all regressions: age, age squared, years education, married, male, 
health, unemp, selfemp, retired, and student
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Figure 4. Happiness Gap in Honduras and Chile
Happiness Gap = wealth gap * coefficient ÷ 4
Poor Rich
Chile wealth gap -2.489 2.521
Honduras wealth gap -2.142 3.261
Chile-Honduras difference 0.347 0.740
difference * coefficient / 4
= Honduran happiness differential
Wealth quintile Chile Honduras Overall Chile Honduras Overall
1 2.54 3.11 2.73 5.26 2.64 3.12
2 2.74 3.15 2.85 7.00 4.00 5.00
3 2.77 3.17 2.91 8.00 5.00 6.00
4 2.94 3.13 2.97 9.00 6.00 7.46
5 3.08 3.30 3.08 10.27 8.04 9.63
Total 2.79 3.17 2.88 7.76 4.78 5.81
Regionwide results: rich are 3.83 points higher than mean; poor are 2.68 points lower than mean. 
These gaps * .05/4 = 5% > happiness for the rich and 3% < happiness for the poor. 
Calculated Happiness Gap
0.43% 0.93%




Average Honduran wealth: 4.8
Poor Hondurans: wealth = 2.6
Poor Chileans:    wealth = 5.3
Rich Hondurans: wealth =  8.0









Table 5a. Components of the ELQ and Relative ELQ
OLS regression of a 1-10 scale of the economic ladder question
Controls include standard demographic variables and country dummies, clustered by country/city size
Average ELQ is computed at the country/city size level
ELQ coefficient relative ELQ coefficient relative ELQ coefficient
age -0.026 -5.98 ** age -0.026 -6.14 ** age -0.026 -6.040 **
age squared 0.000 4.56 ** age squared 0.000 4.59 ** age2 0.000 4.580 **
education 0.059 11.05 ** education 0.056 10.74 ** yedu 0.057 10.830 **
wealth 0.188 21.71 ** wealth 0.184 22.21 ** wealth 0.186 22.000 **
married 0.034 1.52 married 0.030 1.32 married 0.031 1.390 *
male -0.107 -4.29 ** male -0.106 -4.26 ** male -0.106 -4.280 **
health 0.228 9.59 ** health 0.226 9.57 ** health 0.227 9.580 **
unemployed -0.103 -2.59 ** unemployed -0.105 -2.6 ** unemp -0.105 -2.600 **
self-employed -0.023 -0.85 self-employed -0.016 -0.6 selfemp -0.019 -0.680
retired 0.098 1.44 retired 0.091 1.34 retired 0.093 1.380
student 0.098 1.69 student 0.091 1.58 student 0.093 1.620
small town 0.047 0.69 small town 0.214 4.47 ** smalltown 0.157 4.080 **
big city 0.080 2.12 ** big city -0.291 -8.74 ** bigcity -0.164 -5.490 **
avgELQ -0.341 -6.750 **
z-score z-score z-score
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Table 5b. Average and Relative ELQ and Happiness
OLS regression of a 1-5 scale of happiness
Controls include standard demographic variables and country dummies, clustered by country/city size
Average ELQ is computed at the country/city size level
happy coefficient
average ELQ 0.1297 1.76
relative ELQ 0.1245 6.65 **
OLS regression of a 1-5 scale of happiness
Controls include standard demographic variables and country dummies, clustered by country/city size
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Table 6a. Cost of Unemployment
Ordered logit regression of a 1-5 scale of happiness for 2004 data set
Controls include standard demographic variables and country dummies
coefficient
unemployed -0.342 -6.05 **
Ordered logit regression of a 1-5 scale of happiness for pooled 1997-2004 data set
Controls include standard demographic variables and year dummies
coefficient
unemployed -1.347 -5.18 **
unemployed*gini coefficient 0.018 3.80 **
Ordered logit regression of a 1-5 scale of happiness
Controls include standard demographic variables and country dummies
Costs of unemployment by education level.  Base case is illiterate
coefficient
unemployed (incomplete primary) -0.485 -3.83 **
unemployed (completed primary) -0.205 -1.63
unemployed (incomplete secondary) -0.511 -4.46 **
unemployed (completed secondary) -0.562 -5.17 **
unemployed (incomplete tertiary) 0.027 0.13
unemployed (completed tertiary) -0.246 -1.39
Table 6b. Fear of Unemployment
Ordered logit regression of a 1-5 scale of fear of unemployment
coefficient
small town -0.256 -4.34 **
big city 0.081 1.87
Ordered logit regression of a 1-5 scale of fear of unemployment
coefficient






Controls include standard demographic variables (except dummy variables for jobs 
that are not in the workforce)
Controls include standard demographic variables (except dummy variables for jobs 
that are not in the workforce) and country dummies
 
 
 